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Abstract: This essay offers a reconstruction of Aristotle’s account of the voluntary in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, arguing that the voluntary grounds one notion of responsibility 
with two levels, and therefore both rational and non-rational animals are responsible 
for voluntary actions. Aristotle makes no distinction between causal and moral re-
sponsibility in the NE; rather, voluntariness and prohairesis form different bases for 
responsibility and make possible different levels of responsibility, but both levels of 
responsibility fall within the ethical sphere and are aptly appraised. However, there are 
important differences between the two levels. Animals and children are aptly appraised 
for direct voluntary actions. Conversely, only adults capable of prohairesis or rational 
choice are appraised for indirect voluntary actions—psychologically compelled actions 
that stem from character. Furthermore, this two-tiered account of the voluntary reveals 
an implicit distinction in Aristotle between synchronic and diachronic responsibility. 
Aristotle holds that only adults casually contribute to the formation of their charac-
ters. Children and animals lacking prohairesis cannot develop character traits and are 
therefore not diachronically responsible. However, Aristotle allows that children and 
non-human animals can be synchronically responsible: actions and emotions that 
they cause (arché) through their own conscious activity are aptly praised and blamed. 
Introduction
In Nicomachean Ethics III.1,1 Aristotle states that hekousios (the voluntary) must be defined, because “voluntary feelings and actions are praised and 
blamed” (καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων).2 In 
III.2 he goes onto define prohairesis (rational choice or decision), because it is 
“very closely tied to virtue, and a better guide to men’s characters (ἦθος) than 
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their actions (πράξεων).” He distinguishes the voluntary and rational choice, 
noting that the voluntary “is a broader notion” than rational choice (1111b.2). 
Children and animals—along with adult humans—share in the voluntary, but 
not in rational choice. An interpretive puzzle emerges: children and animals are 
capable of voluntariness, and voluntary actions are praised and blamed, but does 
Aristotle think that children and animals are apt candidates of the same kind of 
praise and blame as adults? Put differently, is the voluntary action of children and 
animals appraisable in the same way as the voluntary and prohairetic action of 
adults? Or are these sufficiently different kinds of actions such that they belong 
in different categories of praise and blame? 
This essay offers a reconstruction of Aristotle’s account of the voluntary in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, arguing that it contains one notion of responsibility with 
two levels, and that rational and non-rational animals are both responsible for 
voluntary actions. Animals and children who are capable of voluntary (hekousios) 
actions are weak ethical agents—responsible agents who are sometimes the apt 
recipients of reactive attitudes such as praise and blame. Conversely, only adults 
capable of prohairesis or rational choice are strong or full ethical agents—re-
sponsible agents whose voluntary actions causally contributed to the formation 
of their characters and therefore are aptly praised and blamed for the actions and 
occurrent mental states that stem from character. Furthermore, this two-tiered 
account of the voluntary reveals an implicit distinction in Aristotle between 
synchronic and diachronic responsibility. Aristotle clearly holds that only adults 
are robust ethical agents who have casually contributed to the formation of their 
characters. Only adults are diachronically responsible, because only adults know 
that their repeated activities form their habitual dispositions (1114a12). Those 
dispositions will produce some actions that are not themselves voluntary; how-
ever, adults are responsible for those psychologically compelled actions because 
their own voluntary actions formed their action-generating traits. I call these 
psychologically compelled actions that stem from voluntary character traits in-
direct voluntary actions. Children and animals lacking prohairesis cannot develop 
character traits and are therefore not diachronically responsible. However, Aristotle 
allows that children and non-human animals can be synchronically responsible: 
actions and emotions that they cause (arché) through their own conscious activ-
ity are aptly praised and blamed. Therefore, children and non-rational animals 
can be responsible for their direct voluntary actions, but in the case of animals 
these actions will not contribute to character formation (as they normally will in 
children). Children and animals are capable of direct voluntary actions that are 
morally praised and blamed and are thus synchronically responsible. Due to the 
possession of prohairesis, adults are capable of both direct and indirect voluntary 
actions and are morally praised and blamed for their indirect voluntary actions 
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that stem from character that they causally contributed to. Therefore, only adults 
capable of prohairetic choice are diachronically responsible. 
One point of clarification is needed before the main argument begins. This 
problem exists in part because many commentators assume that Aristotle is giv-
ing us an account of moral responsibility. If Aristotle is discussing moral praise 
and blame, then we must figure out how the voluntary actions of and children 
and animals fit into the discussion, because commentators tend to have in mind 
a very modern notion of moral responsibility (e.g., specific notions of causal 
determinism, alternative possibilities, and psychological development), and this 
modern notion almost always excludes children and animals.3 With this mod-
ern assumption in the background, some commentators solve the hekousios/
prohairesis problem by drawing a distinction between causal and moral respon-
sibility: causal responsibility is attributed to children and animals, but not moral 
responsibility.4 I avoid making this distinction, because Aristotle himself makes no 
such distinction. Furthermore, he never tells us that he is referring specifically to 
moral responsibility. Yet the section on voluntariness comes in the middle of the 
discussion of êthikê aretê and its associated actions and emotions, so it would 
be strange if Aristotle was discussing responsibility that does not fall within the 
ethical realm. Therefore, I avoid the causal and moral adjectives. I argue that 
although there are important differences between the kind of responsibility 
grounded by hekousios and prohairesis, both are types of responsibility that fall 
within the ethical sphere. 
Aristotle on the Voluntary
First, a brief review Aristotle’s understanding of the voluntary. In NE III.1, Aristotle 
articulates three necessary components of voluntary action (although he only 
explicitly mentions two). First, a voluntary action cannot be caused by external 
force (bia).5 The arché— source or first principle—must be within the agent 
(1110a1–2). If the action is forced (like a gust of wind forcing me off balance which 
results in my tumbling into you), then it cannot be the result of the agent’s own 
impulse or will. Contemporary theorists refer to this as the sourcehood condition 
for responsibility ascriptions: the source of the action must come from within the 
agent and not be directly (and completely) traceable to some external cause (the 
agent must be at least be a co-cause).6 When unpacking this issue of force, Aris-
totle seems to draw a distinction between force (bia) and compulsion (anagké).7 
He brings up the example of “people throwing cargo overboard in storms at sea,” 
noting that “no one jettisons cargo voluntarily” (1110a5). This is an example of 
a mixed or composite (miktos) action because it was not something a person 
would voluntarily do under normal circumstances. But Aristotle concludes that 
these compelled actions are more voluntary than involuntary, “because at the 
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time they are done they are worthy of choice.”8 Broadie and Rowe’s translation is 
helpful: “for the actions in question are desired at the time of action” (1110a6).9 
The point is that the person wanted to perform the action at that time, despite 
conflicting desires. But the conflicting desires make the action a mixed voluntary 
action. Bostock explains, “in one way I want to do it, and in another way I don’t. 
But there is nothing mixed about my decision, and that is what is relevant to our 
topic of praise and blame. The decision is simply to throw the cargo overboard, and 
clearly it is up to me whether to do that or not.”10 This type of action is voluntary 
because in the end, the agent does what the agent wants to do.
The reader might still wonder at this point what distinguishes this compelled 
(yet voluntary) action from a forced (and therefore involuntary) action. Aristotle 
states that the mixed voluntary agent—the agent who does what he wants despite 
the presence of external pressures—“has within him the principle (arché) . . . (and) 
if the principle of the actions is in him, it is also up to him to do them or not to 
do them” (1110a16–18, my emphasis).11 Irwin notes, “The fact that the principle 
is in the agent convinces Aristotle that the actions are really voluntary, and up 
to the agent.”12 But this passage indicates more than mere agential sourcehood. 
Being the arché of the action means that the agent causally controlled the action. 
As Meyer puts it, “the ‘up to us’ locution used by Aristotle implies causal respon-
sibility. Such agents are in control (kurios) of their actions (NE III.5.1114a2–3; 
EE II.6.1223a6–7); they are responsible (aitioi) for them: ‘A person is responsible 
[aitios] for those things that are up to him to do or not to do, and if he is responsible 
[aitios] for them, then they are up to him’ (EE II.6.1223a7–9; cf. 1223a15–18).”13 
Aristotle explicitly states in the Eudemian Ethics that the “up to us” locution is a 
property of voluntary actions, not only prohairetic actions.14 And this is reinforced 
in the NE when Aristotle gives an example of a forced action: “people with power 
(κύριος) over him carry him somewhere” (1110a5). A forced and thus involuntary 
action is an action that happens to the agent, the agent being passive and lacking 
control. Conversely, a voluntary action is an action that the agent has the control 
to bring about, as Müller says, through the agent’s “own conscious effort.”15 To 
better understand the difference between arché (i.e., sourcehood) and kurios 
(i.e., control), note that a plant has the arché of its development within itself—it 
is a psuché insofar as its principle of development is internal—but there is no 
conscious effort involved in the plant taking in sunlight and nutrients. Both 
humans and non-rational animals, however, can consciously direct their actions 
due to their cognitive capacities. Thus control—the ability to consciously bring 
about and complete a change16—is the second, often overlooked, condition of 
voluntary action, and is especially important to keep in mind when discussing 
children and non-rational animals. 
Aristotle’s second explicitly stated condition of the voluntary is that the action 
cannot be done out of ignorance (unless one is the cause of one’s own ignorance). 
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Aristotle explains the notion of ignorance by contrasting knowledge of particu-
lars with knowledge of universals. Ignorance that compromises ascriptions of 
praise and blame occurs when the agent is ignorant of “the particulars—the 
circumstances of the action and what it is concerned with” and not “the universal” 
(1111a1–2). For instance, if the agent really believes (and has reason to believe) 
that she is shooting an intruder but is mistaken, the action is involuntary. She did 
not have sufficient understanding of the particulars of the situation to warrant 
blame, and her ignorance wasn’t her fault. If, however, she knows that the intruder 
is not a threat, but is angered by his intrusion and for that reason alone shoots him, 
then her action was voluntary and she is culpable. She was mistaken about the 
principle, not about the particulars, and her anger was the cause of this ignorance. 
To conclude with Bostock, “The contrast, then, appears to be that between general 
moral rules and facts concerning the particular situation.”17 Ignorance about the 
general moral rules will not get the agent off the hook, but ignorance about the 
particular circumstances can. This is the epistemic condition of responsibility 
ascriptions. This distinction between moral principles and particulars is crucial 
since Aristotle is discussing something that applies to children and animals. Both 
have awareness of particulars, but not of universals. Thus, children and animals 
can meet the epistemic requirement for voluntariness. These three conditions— 
control in addition to Aristotle’s explicitly stated sourcehood and epistemic—must 
be met for a singular action or emotion to be voluntary and thus aptly appraised. 
Prohairesis—described in more detail below—grounds approbation for actions 
stemming from character traits, something only adults can possess. 
Three Views of the Voluntary
I am making the case that voluntariness and prohairesis both ground approbation, 
albeit different levels of approbation. This view is quite different from the common 
interpretations. The most common interpretation of the relationship between 
voluntariness and prohairesis is the dismissal view. Dismissal accounts dismiss 
Aristotle’s claim that the voluntary actions that children and animals perform 
are morally praised and blamed. There are two main strategies for argument. 
One strategy is arguing that the discussion of the voluntary in NE is an example 
of Aristotle’s endoxic method, and Aristotle both moves “from common-sense-
based and common-opinion-based discussion of the voluntary as a requirement 
for praise or blame in NE iii 1 to his explanation of the underlying psychological 
apparatus in NE iii 2–5.”18 In other words, Aristotle doesn’t think children and ani-
mals are aptly appraised; rather, he is citing common opinion. A second common 
dismissal strategy is to admit that the voluntary and prohairesis are two different 
accounts of causation or responsibility, but to dismiss that voluntariness is an 
account of moral responsibility. Perhaps the most well-known dismissal strategy 
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belongs to Irwin. Irwin argues that moral responsibility requires prohairesis, or 
the ability to decide effectively about a course of action.19 Note that these views 
assume that Aristotle is articulating a theory of moral responsibility, a point never 
made explicit by Aristotle. 
The next approach is the compromise approach; it is a compromise in two 
respects. First, it presents a compromise between hekousios and prohairesis based 
actions: both are rightly praised and blamed, despite the important differences 
between the two accounts. Second, it offers a compromise between Irwin’s claim 
that only creatures capable of prohairesis—i.e., mature humans—are apt candi-
dates of praise and blame, and the hardline view that many intelligent non-human 
animals are morally appraisable. In other words, the compromise view interprets 
the voluntary as appraisability grounding for young children, but not animals. 
Nussbaum exemplifies the compromise view, arguing that proper praise and blame 
of the child’s voluntary—but not deliberate—actions will play a vital role in shap-
ing the child’s cognitive, desiderative, and deliberative capacities.20 Therefore, she 
thinks that children, but not animals, are aptly praised and blamed. Note again, 
the distinction between children and animals is not in the text.
The third approach is the hardline approach, which takes the “hardline” on 
Aristotle’s claims that voluntary actions are praised and blamed, and children 
and animals are capable of the voluntary.21 A question remains, however, as to 
what kind of praise and blame Aristotle is referring to. Is it the praise we give a 
toddler for walking for the first time, or to an athlete for winning a race? Praise 
conferred because the agent accomplished the action on their own and the action 
was commendable? Or does he mean the praise we give a soldier who ran into 
battle to save his comrade, or the praise we give a mother who skips dinner so 
that her child gets enough to eat? Aristotle does not sharply distinguish between 
these kinds of appraisal in the text, but the context of the discussion—the general 
description and examples of character excellence—indicate that Aristotle is dis-
cussing responsibility for actions and emotions that fall within the ethical sphere. 
So, despite the important differences between voluntary and prohairetic-based 
responsibility, the hardline approach asserts that both voluntary and prohairetic 
action fall within this ethical sphere.22 
Advocates of the hardline approach include Richard Sorabji, who claims that 
there is nothing in Aristotle’s account that bars children and animals from the 
same fundamental kind of responsibility as adults: “non-rational animals can 
sometimes be held responsible.”23 Sorabji thinks that so long as creatures can 
satisfy Aristotle’s three criteria for voluntary action, then they are apt candidates 
for praise and blame. However, Sorabji does not consider the important distinc-
tion between voluntary action and prohairetic choice. While Aristotle does allow 
that children are animals are aptly appraised for particular actions, only adults 
are aptly praised for actions that stem from character traits. 
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Another advocate of the hardline approach is Jozef Müller, who argues that 
voluntariness and prohairesis ground the same basic kind of responsibility for 
Aristotle, but only agents capable of prohairesis are “responsible for being the sort 
of individual that performs it (the action)” (2015, p. 207). My view goes beyond 
Müller’s in two important ways. First, it is rooted in the Nicomachean Ethics (the 
more widely read text) rather than the Eudemian Ethics. Second, I demonstrate 
that the context of the discussion of the voluntary in NE suggests that Aristotle 
is primarily interested in the appraisability of actions, not character, and he as-
sumes a principle of the transitive property of moral responsibility. Since adults 
causally contributed to the formation of their characters through direct voluntary 
actions (actions that meet the criteria for voluntariness) and prohairetic actions, 
they are also responsible for actions that stem from character (what I call indirect 
voluntary actions). One important upshot of this interpretation is that non- or 
not-yet-fully rational beings are capable of direct voluntary actions, the same 
kind of actions that contribute to character in rational beings. Since Aristotle is 
mainly concerned to demonstrate the appraisability of voluntary actions, the most 
logical conclusion is that he thinks that non-rational animals are appraisable and 
responsible for their direct voluntary actions. 
Character and the Voluntary
An objection lurks in the background: what textual justification is there for claim-
ing that voluntary actions and emotions are praised and blamed in the same 
fundamental way as prohairesis-based actions and emotions? I propose that the 
claim that voluntary actions yield responsibility and are thus appraisable is justi-
fied by its context: the primary focus of the entire section on responsibility is on 
actions, not character, and therefore on outlining the necessary conditions for 
the responsibility for actions and emotions. Furthermore, the discussion takes 
place in the middle of the exposition of character excellence, so the actions and 
emotions in question are all within the ethical realm. Finally, Aristotle notes in 
several passages that voluntary but not prohairetic actions are rightly appraised. 
The important difference is that while only the agent capable of prohairesis is aptly 
appraised for having the right dispositions (insofar as these dispositions cause 
actions), the merely voluntary agent is aptly appraised for performing the right 
actions (1105b28–1106a7; 1135a20–25; 1135a4–5; EE 1234a24–5). So, there is an 
important difference in the praise and blame afforded to voluntary and prohairetic 
agents, but it is not that one is given ethical or moral praise while the other is not. 
Both are responsible and thus appraised for their actions, but only the prohairetic 
agent is additionally appraised based on character traits. Prohairesis deepens—but 
does not fundamentally change—the notion of responsibility. 
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The opening claim of chapter one is “voluntary actions are praised and blamed” 
(1109b31). In chapter two Aristotle notes that we must now consider prohairesis, 
because it is “a better guide to men’s characters than their actions” (1111b6–7). 
We might assume from this statement that we have moved away from actions 
to deeper psychological elements. And in one way, that is correct. Chapters two 
through four deal with prohairesis, deliberation, and wish, all rational capaci-
ties. But everything comes to a head in chapter five, and Aristotle sums up the 
discussion thus far: “Since, then, an object of wish is the end, and the object of 
wish and of rational choice is what conduces to the end, actions concerning what 
conduces to the end will be in accordance with rational choice and voluntary” 
(1113b 2–3, my emphasis). The focus on actions should not surprise the reader 
since throughout the Ethics Aristotle focuses on the appraisability of actions.24 
Every virtue is appraised for the mean actions and emotions is produces. A tem-
perate person is praised because they only desire and eat as much as needed for 
good health (1119a11–16).25 The mild person is praised for only having brief 
moments of anger aimed at the proper objects (1125b31–33). When inquiring 
about the appraisability of happiness at the end of book one, Aristotle notes that 
“the just person, the brave person, and the good person and virtue in general we 
praise for their actions and what they bring about” (110lbl4–16, my emphasis). 
Aristotle assumes throughout the first half of the Ethics that we appraise actions 
and emotions, and so his primary goal in book three is to articulate the criteria 
for responsibility for actions and emotions, not character traits.
Still, it is often assumed that the aim of this section is to articulate responsibil-
ity for character.26 The confusion is caused by Aristotle’s discussion of character 
states in III.5. However, a close look at chapter five reveals that this section is 
primarily concerned with articulating the conditions of voluntary action. Ar-
istotle is trying to solve a puzzle: if an agent commits actions that are caused 
by his character traits, and it is no longer in the agent’s power to affect those 
traits (thus not meeting the control condition), then is the agent responsible 
for these actions that stem from character?27 After all, the actions themselves are 
not voluntary since they do not meet the control condition.28 These are in fact a 
form of compelled action, but the compulsion stems from the agent’s own freely 
formed character. This conundrum is most clearly expressed at 1114a19–20: “So 
too from the start it was open to the unjust person and the intemperate person 
not to become such, so that they are what they are voluntarily; but now that they 
have become what they are, it is no longer possible for them to be otherwise” (my 
emphasis). Agents start off able to become virtuous or vicious through their own 
conscious effort—“virtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature” 
(1103a19–20)—and because both options are open to them. If the actions that 
formed their character meet the criteria of voluntariness, then their character was 
acquired voluntarily. But now that one possesses a solidified character—a deeply 
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entrenched disposition to actions and emotions—one will tend to act from that 
character and may find it difficult, if not impossible, to intentionally act against 
one’s character.29 And since Aristotle is clear that actions reveal character, the 
agent is the arché of actions that stem from a character that the agent no longer 
maintains control over. 
Aristotle answers this conundrum along the following lines: an agent is re-
sponsible for particular actions that do not meet all the requirements for voluntary 
action so long as two conditions are met: first, the agent’s voluntary actions caus-
ally contributed to the formation of the character that in turn generates those 
compelled actions, and second, the agent must be capable of prohairesis, since 
Aristotle thinks that prohairesis is necessary for the formation of character (virtue 
is defined as a hexis prohairetikè at 1106b36–1107a2). The agent’s actions that 
contributed to character are what I call direct voluntary actions—they meet the 
requirements of the voluntary. The actions that stem from character but do not 
meet the requirements of the voluntary—because the agent no longer has control 
over those actions—are still responsible actions, but they only indirectly meet 
the requirements of voluntariness, because they are psychologically compelled 
actions.30 As Meyer notes, Aristotle is assuming “the transitivity of responsibility.”31 
If an agent’s voluntary actions causally contributed to the formation of his char-
acter, then the agent is responsible for actions that stem from character, even if 
those character-driven actions do not themselves meet the criteria of the voluntary. 
Those are indirect voluntary actions, and the agent is responsible for them. 
The reader might grant that voluntary actions belong to the agent is an 
important respect, but still object to the claim that direct voluntary actions can 
contribute to the formation of character, countering that only prohairetic voluntary 
actions contribute to character formation. Aristotle emphasizes that one cannot 
have a character trait without prohairesis: “virtues are rational choices or at any 
rate involve rational choices” (1106a4–5). Furthermore, Aristotle states in the 
same passage that “we are neither praised nor blamed on the basis of our feel-
ings” (1105b29–30). Some might argue based on this passage that only virtues 
(or actions stemming from virtues) are aptly appraised. But this cannot be the 
right conclusion based on numerous other claims that Aristotle makes. Consider 
his discussion of just actions and just agents in V.8: “Whether something is an 
unjust or just act is determined by what is voluntary and what is involuntary. For 
when it is voluntary, it is blamed, and is thereby also an unjust act” (1135a20–23, 
my emphasis). After discussing the relationship between voluntariness and pro-
hairesis, he concludes, “a person is just when he acts justly by rational choice, but 
acts justly if he merely acts voluntarily” (1135a4–5). A person does not have to 
act on rational choice to commit an appraisable (e.g., unjust) action; if the agent 
committed the action voluntarily, the agent is responsible. A similar distinction is 
drawn in the Eudemian Ethics, where Aristotle explicitly states that there are mean 
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emotional states that are not virtues or vices but yet are praiseworthy: “Though all 
these mean points are praiseworthy, they are not virtues, nor are their opposites 
vices, since they do not involve decision (prohairesis)” (EE 1234a24–5).32 Aristotle 
notes that these emotions and actions stem from natural dispositions that, when 
combined with thought in the proper way, can become virtues. This is crucial: 
natural dispositions that are praiseworthy can develop into virtues.
Based on these passages, it cannot be the case the Aristotle thinks that only 
prohairetic states and/or actions are aptly appraised. But that does not mean 
that there are no differences between voluntary and prohairetic actions. In the 
previously cited passage from II.5, Aristotle notes that we are not appraised for 
our feelings, we are appraised for our characteristics, because “in respect of the 
virtues and vices we are said not to be affected but rather disposed in a certain 
way” (1106a7).33 The focus in this passage is on the genus of virtue, and dis-
tinguishing virtue from feelings. There is proper appraisal for the person with 
virtuous or vicious dispositions. But this does not rule out the possibility of a 
broader notion or appraisal. After all, a person can be appraised for performing 
an unjust action so long as it is voluntary: “When the agent acts knowingly, but 
without previous deliberation, it is an injustice: for example, actions done from 
spirit and the other feelings that are necessary for human beings” (1135b20–263). 
Here the connection is explicit: voluntary actions motivated by spirit or emotion 
are aptly blamed, but the person cannot be just (have the character trait of justice) 
without prohairesis. There is a spectrum of appraisability that spans the range 
of voluntary and prohairetic actions: a person is aptly appraised for voluntary 
ethical actions and emotions, but only a person with prohairesis can be appraised 
for their ethical character and the actions that stem from character. 
Prohairesis is necessary for character traits, but not for appraisal or responsibil-
ity. However, Prohairesis plays a crucial role in character formation that illuminates 
a further distinction between simple direct voluntary actions and chosen DVAs. 
The agent who has developed the intellectual capacity of prohairesis still performs 
DVAs, that is, actions that meet all the criteria of the voluntary including control. 
But the rational agent can also perform DVAs that are based on prohairesis. These 
chosen DVAs allow the agent to develop character traits and thus be responsible 
for indirect voluntary actions and for psychologically compelled actions—in-
voluntary actions that stem from a voluntary, chosen character. Once one has 
developed character through voluntary chosen actions, then one has diachronic 
responsibly because one’s character extends across time and will generate actions 
in the future that may be compelled but that one is still responsible for due to the 
causal role the agent played in developing that character. Prohairesis is necessary 
for diachronic responsibility, responsibility for actions that stem from character. 
Another objection lurks in the background. The reader might grant that 
Aristotle’s overall focus is on actions, but still argue that one of his objectives is 
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to articulate the necessary conditions for the responsibility for character. Several 
passages suggest this aim. Yet the primary goal of these passages remains to show 
that the agent is responsible for indirect voluntary actions. Consider the following 
passage: “wickedness is voluntary; otherwise we shall have to disagree with what 
we have just said (that both virtue and vice are in our power), and deny that a hu-
man being is a first principle or the begetter of his actions as he is of his children” 
(1113b15). Wickedness (and goodness) are voluntary because the agent is the 
arché of his actions and thus responsible. And repeated actions make one what one 
is, a principle Aristotle emphasizes numerous times: e.g., “like states arise from 
like activities (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται)” (1103b16). The 
point of the passage is to show that the state of wickedness is voluntary because the 
actions that causally contributed to the formation of the agent’s wicked disposition 
were voluntary. Certainly, a secondary assertion is that voluntary and prohairetic 
agents are responsible for their character, but the primary aim is to show that they 
are responsible even for actions that are no longer fully voluntary. Consider one 
other passage, when Aristotle asks whether legislators are justified in punishing 
someone for ignorance due to negligence: “people are themselves responsible for 
turning out like this, through the slackness of their lives – responsible for being 
unjust by doing wrong, or intemperate by spending their time in drinking and 
the like; in each sphere, people’s activities give them the corresponding character 
(ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται)” (1114a10–11). Again, Aristotle is 
arguing that someone who commits a crime due to ignorance is still responsible 
so long as the actions in question stem from a character that was acquired through 
chosen DVAs. The actions in question do not meet the criteria of voluntary—in 
this case they fail to meet the epistemic requirement because the agent was ig-
norant at the time of action—but they are still responsible actions because they 
are indirect voluntary actions, that is, involuntary actions that directly stem from 
character that was acquired voluntarily. 
Thus far, I have argued that there are two levels of responsibility, voluntary-
based responsibility (DVAs) and prohairesis-based responsibility (chosen DVAs 
and IDAs). Voluntariness grounds responsibility for particular actions—syn-
chronic responsibility—while prohairesis grounds responsibility for actions 
that stem from character—diachronic responsibility. To counter the objection 
that the primary aim of NE III.1–5 is provide the necessary conditions for the 
responsibility of character, I have argued that Aristotle’s goal is to provide the 
necessary conditions for the responsibility of actions and emotions, not character. 
But at this point the reader might wonder, what relevance does this argument 
have to the moral appraisability of children and animals? Consider the nature 
of voluntary actions that contribute to the formation of character and thus dia-
chronic responsibility. Recall that Aristotle thinks character is largely formed 
during one’s upbringing. Aristotle states in II.1 that “it is not unimportant how 
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we are habituated from our early days; indeed, it makes a huge difference – or 
rather, all the difference” (1103b22–25). Early habituation contributes heavily to 
character. This is reinforced in X.9: “the soul of the listener must first have been 
conditioned by habits to the right kinds of likes and dislikes” for that person 
to listen to arguments (1179b24). “To change by argument what has long been 
ingrained in a character is impossible or, at least, not easy” (1179b18). Aristotle 
assumes that actions performed before the agent’s deliberative and prohairetic 
capacities were developed form that agent’s (habituated) character traits; however, 
that agent is now responsible for the actions that stem from that character.34 Both 
voluntary and prohairetic-based actions form character, and the agent is directly 
responsible for these voluntary actions despite the lack of developed rational 
capacities. But once the agent’s character is formed, the agent is responsible for 
actions that stem from character that do not themselves meet the criteria of the 
voluntary (IDAs) due to the transitive properties of responsibility. Voluntary ac-
tions are sometimes performed by non- or not-yet-fully rational beings, and those 
appraisable actions contribute to the formation of character which then issues in 
psychologically compelled actions, also appraisable.35 A child performs actions 
that build character, and those actions are voluntary and thus responsible, but 
not based on prohairesis. Surely Nussbaum is right that the child is aptly praised 
and blamed. What about an animal? The animal (like the child qua child) cannot 
be responsible for indirect voluntary actions (because an animal does not have 
a rational capacity and thus cannot form character traits), but why can’t an ani-
mal be responsible for direct voluntary actions just like the child is? The animal 
performs activities (actions and emotions) that are within the ethical sphere 
(Aristotle notes that animals are angry, jealous, compassionate, etc.36), and many 
non-rational animals (per Aristotle’s explicit admission and based on descriptions 
in other texts) have the capacities necessary for voluntary action.37 Therefore, we 
should take Aristotle seriously when he says that children and animals perform 
voluntary actions, and these actions are appraisable. 
Conclusion
I have argued that Aristotle holds a two-tiered account of responsibility ascrip-
tions. Agents are aptly praised and blamed for voluntary actions and emotions 
and are also praised and blamed for prohairetic actions and emotions. Agents 
only capable of voluntary actions, such as children and non-rational animals, 
can be aptly appraised for ethical actions and emotions, but cannot be appraised 
for psychologically compelled actions and emotions that stem from character 
traits, since without prohairesis they cannot develop character. As stated earlier, 
this interpretation goes against the common view. For instance, Irwin thinks that 
Aristotle’s “ascription of voluntary action to animals and children is reasonable, 
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but dangerous . . . (since) he insists that an action is a candidate for praise and 
blame if and only if it is voluntary.”38 Why is this dangerous? Animals and young 
children as well as adults can be responsible while still maintaining important 
differences between the responsibility of rational and non-rational animals. In 
fact, recognizing the rich cognitive capacities of animals can be beneficial to hu-
mans and animals alike. As Nussbaum states, “It is our nature to be animal, the 
sort of animal that is rational. If we do not give a debased account of the animal 
or a puffed-up account of the rational, we will be in a position to see how well 
suited the one is to contribute to the flourishing of the other.”39 Despite Aristotle’s 
denial of rationality to animals, this reconstruction of the voluntary helps us ap-
preciate Aristotle’s own view of the deeply intertwined natures of the human and 
the animal.40 Aristotle recognized the profound cognitive capacities of animals 
which ground their ability to act voluntarily, and he placed them within the ethical 
sphere, broadly conceived. Perhaps we should follow his lead. 
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